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Trananatonal Restraints
Eleanor M. Fox* and Lawrence A. Sullivan**
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade we have seen a new internationalization of busi-
ness and a new internationalization of competition/industrial policy.
The internationalization of business has led to lively, and some would say
destructive, competition within the United States. The internationaliza-
tion of competition/industrial policy could invite a return of world
cartels.
II. WORLD CARTELS
The shrinking world has produced a complex phenomenon-a mix
of competition and restraint, a mix of private action and government ac-
tion, and a separation of domestic policy from export policy.' Even
though most industrialized nations now have antitrust laws, virtually all
such nations also have policies to treat export collaboration by their na-
tionals as beyond the reach of their antitrust laws.2 In theory, the coun-
try of targeted impact can sue the cartelists, and it sometimes does, but
* Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
** Earl Warren Professor of Public Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California,
Berkeley.
1 See Sullivan, U.S. Policy in a Mixed World Economy, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 309
(1983).
2 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, EXPORT CARTELS 8-
21 (1974).
The United States moved in this direction by enacting two statutes in 1982: the Export Trading
Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982); and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a), 45 (1982). The Export Trading Company Act provides limited
antitrust immunity for export plans that are certified as not likely to harm domestic competition.
The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act states that the Sherman and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts do not apply to transactions not involving import commerce which do not have a
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foreign protective legislation3 and "diplomacy" normally counsel re-
straint. As a result of broad interpretations of sovereign immunity, the
act of state doctrine, the foreign sovereign compulsion defense, and im-
permissible extraterritoriality, nations, including the United States, have
evidenced little interest in challenging even some of the most threatening
international restraints, inspired by the notion that export cartels facili-
tate exports and the hope that leniency to foreign actors will beget
reciprocity.
When Thurman Arnold became Assistant Attorney General in
1938, he discovered a multitude of world cartels that had eluded enforce-
ment in the name of joint ventures or extraterritoriality.4 We are in dan-
ger of harboring the same phenomenon today. A positive enforcement
and legislative agenda addressed to the world cartel problem could re-
verse the trend. This would include:
1. A closer look at U.S. export cartels, with a more serious investiga-
tion into other possible spill-over effects on the U.S. economy.
2. A closer examination of export collaborations, even those not ob-
viously driven by the cartelists' desire to eliminate their own competi-
tion against one another, also with a view to examining cartel-like
effects on the U.S. economy.
3. Much greater efforts to deter export cartels that sell into the
United States and willingness to sue foreign producers who join such
cartels.
If the United States is sending signals to other nations, such as Ja-
pan, that it welcomes their producers' export restraints,5 it should stop
sending those signals. To the extent that U.S. policymakers are gener-
ously construing sovereign immunity, the act of state defense, and the
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect on domestic competition, or on export trade of a
U.S. exporter.
On November 10, 1988, the Department of Justice published its Antitrust Enforcement Guide-
lines for International Guidelines, reprinted in 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1391
(Spec. Supp. Nov. 17, 1988)[hereinafter 1988 Guidelines]. While recognizing that even the 1982
legislation preserves some jurisdiction with respect to export trade, the Justice Department said, "the
Department is concerned only with adverse effects on competition that would harm U.S. consumers
by reducing output or raising prices." Id. at S-21 n. 159.
3 See, eg., British Protection of Trading Interests Act (1980). Blocking, and in some cases
clawback, legislation has been adopted by nations including Australia, Canada, France, and Great
Britain. See 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
§§ 4.17-4.18 (1981 & 1988 Supps.).
4 See T. ARNOLD, BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS (1940).
5 See Farnsworth, Car Export Limits Kept by Japanese, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1989, at DI, col. 6.
Cf. Hicks, Effort Begun to Extend Limits on Steel Imports, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1989, at D2, col. 5.
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foreign sovereign compulsion defense,6 with the effect of insulating for-
eign cartels merely because they are approved by the collaborators' home
governments, they should reverse course. To the extent that the Justice
Department is exercising discretion not to sue based upon the foreign
nationality of the principal actors involved and the foreign situs of cartel
agreements, it should cease this practice. Applying the principle of ob-
jective territoriality, U.S. policymakers in the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches should protect the United States' and the free world's
shared interest in competition.
Professor James Rahl-a leading scholar/thinker and a stalwart de-
fender of competition against those who would compromise it in the
name of jurisdictional limits, diplomacy, and reciprocity-would proba-
bly add to the agenda the repeal of the Export Trading Company Act of
1982, 7 which enacted a "hands off" policy for outward bound trade, and
he would clearly add to the agenda world anti-cartel enforcement. For
pragmatic reasons, we have not stressed either of these options. First,
the politics of the times led ineluctably to the passage of the Export Trad-
ing Company Act of 1982. The rhetorical claim that U.S. business was
handicapped in its competition for world markets produced the new law
as a symbolic removal of the imagined handicap. The imagery is just as
strong today as the United States enters the 1990s.
Secondly, Professor Rahl offers the important idea of a world anti-
cartel code that would have the respect of law. Through the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation ("OECD") and the United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), scores of nations
have, on paper, accepted the central principle of these codes, that carte-
lization is wrong.8 But three quite different sets of ideology and fact un-
dermine prospects that this principle will gain the respect of law.
First, the developing countries claim entitlement to a differentiated
principle. The claim is that developing countries may need to orchestrate
production and distribution of their own resources and manufactures
(i.e., cartelize) to promote their development interests and to protect
themselves from exploitation by multinationals. This claim was asserted
in the course of the UNCTAD negotiations regarding the Restrictive
Business Practices Code ("RBP Code"), and it is reflected in the pream-
ble to the RBP Code.9 In addition, the justifications periodically asserted
6 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
7 1988 Guidelines, supra note 2.
8 See Fox, Harnessing the Multinational Corporation to Enhance World Development - The
Rise and Fall and Future of Antitrust as Regulator, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1981 (1989).
9 Id.
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in support of government and multi-government cartels such as OPEC
reflect this idea. Wholly apart from the irony that even the United States
can learn to love the cartel, 10 there is no realistic prospect of convincing
developing countries or communist bloc countries that cartelization,
when engaged in by other than industrialized producers, is wrong.
The second source of resistance to an international cartel law is the
industrialized nations themselves. Each, to protect or aggrandize its na-
tional power, wants to be able to sanction outbound cartels and related
national industrial strategies, and each seems willing to trade off the in-
terests of its domestic buyers in order to protect its ability to assert its
own economic and political power in the world. An international pact to
enforce an international cartel law would make the people of the world
better off. Such an agreement, however, would also destroy the stronger
players' opportunities for power. If the only game were economic, per-
haps the pact could be enforced. But since the stakes are political and
ideological, and the game affects the balance of power in the world, only
rhetorical support of and selective adherence to a world anti-cartel rule is
likely to evolve.
There is a third pull away from a world anti-cartel rule, and while it
can be characterized as a detail, we present it instead as a symbol. Na-
tions demand autonomy so that they may serve the interests of their citi-
zens in their own way. While cartelization involves high costs to society
because it creates economic and political power 1 and distorts resource
allocation, there are times when government and business restraints
serve, or are thought to serve, valuable social functions which outweigh
the expected costs. Each nation at least should be able to choose to util-
ize structures and systems other than competition in order to serve its
own people, and those other structures might be akin to cartels, with
more or less government supervision. Even in the United States, internal
cartel structures abound. Many governmental initiatives aim to achieve
social purposes other than to correct market failures, 2 and many local
governmental initiatives have an effect beyond the boundaries of the
political divisions that adopt them. In the United States, the state action
defense and a network of antitrust exemptions legitimate such
restraints. 13
While competition undermines despotic power and helps to dis-
10 See Schlesinger, OPEC'S New Friend: Us, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1989, at A21, col. 4.
11 See ARNOLD, supra note 4, at 16, for a chilling description of how the cartel system in Ger-
many produced Adolph Hitler, and "[h]ad it not been Hitler, it would have been someone else."
12 See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986).
13 See Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 471 U.S. 48 (1985)(state ac-
tion); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, ch. 9B (1977)(exemptions).
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tribute resources to the poor as well as to the rich, the fact that capitalist
countries often employ cartel-like forms to serve their citizens weakens
the claim to legitimacy of an international principle that cartelization is
wrong. 14 For these reasons, we present our modest three-point agenda
respecting the problem of world cartels.
III. WORLD COMPETITION: THE Z-RAM PROBLEM
While the United States faces troublesome world cartels on the one
hand, it faces allegedly destructive world competition on the other hand.
Even the latter can be in the form of collaboration, such as with a low
price cartel designed to wrest markets from the United States."5 Collabo-
rative or not, low-price competition allegedly threatens the continued vi-
ability of entire segments of U.S. industry. The memory chip market
typifies this issue.16
We present here a prototype problem of the 1990s based on facts of
the 1980s and some flight of fancy. As the reader will discover, we do
not presume to solve the problem. Rather, we hope to provoke thought
and discussion about the kinds of problems likely to arise in the next
decades.
A. Stage One
The fictional Z-RAM microchip has just been invented by a re-
search consortium of U.S. universities, called RECORS. The Z-RAM is
a complex memory microchip that has 500% greater memory and can
perform many more functions than any chip previously developed. It
promises to revolutionize the data industry.
After conversations with IBM and AT&T, each of which provided
generous research grants, RECORS announced that it will license U.S.
producers immediately and will license non-U.S. producers after the
lapse of one year. The availability of the Z-RAM technology leads to
several U.S. merger plans. Before we state these plans, we will describe
the market.' 7
The six largest producers of memory chips are Japanese, namely,
Toshiba, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi and Oki Electric. The U.S.
14 Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 705 (1988).
15 Cf. Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574. See Ordover, Sykes, & Willig, Unfair International Trade Prac-
tices, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L LAW & POL. 323, 328-31 (1983).
16 See Markoff, Experts Warn of U.S. Lag in Vital Chip Technology, N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1988,
at Al, col. 1 [hereinafter Markoff]; Sanger, A New Japanese Push on Chips, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9,
1988, at DI, col. 3 [hereinafter Sanger].
17 Sources of the background market facts include Markoff, supra note 16; Sanger, supra note 16.
Z-RAM, RECORS, and all plans for mergers and other strategies are fictional.
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industry has been overtaken by the Japanese, who sold "D-RAMs" (dy-
namic random access memory chips) to U.S. buyers at prices below the
U.S. producers' costs. The U.S. producers sought trade relief from their
government, and in response, the U.S. government negotiated the 1986
Semiconductor Trade Agreement with Japan. The agreement set floor
prices for imported computer chips, pushing up the market price of chips
in the United States and giving the Japanese extra profits, which they
invested in more research and development ("R&D") and new facilities.
The U.S. Government had hoped that the price umbrella would en-
courage the U.S. chip producers to increase their R&D investments and
expand their chip operations, but it did not. The Japanese continued to
make enormous investments in R&D and new plants, and the size of the
Japanese commitment discouraged U.S. investment. Three U.S. chip
makers, however, continued to be leaders in the market: (1) Texas Instru-
ments, which was recently purchased by a Japanese firm and now makes
most of its D-RAMs in Japan; (2) IBM, the dominant computer com-
pany, which makes chips and sells them to itself, and (3) AT&T, the
dominant telecommunications firm, which is a recent entrant into both
memory chips and computers (the biggest market for memory chips).
Two other U.S. chip producers more or less have held their own: (1)
Motorola, which owns proprietary microprocessor designs and has
formed a joint venture with Toshiba to manufacture chips in Japan; and
(2) Intel, which, like Motorola, holds proprietary microprocessor de-
signs. The other two significant U.S. chip producers, National Semicon-
ductor and Advanced Micro Devices, have been suffering serious losses.
A few years ago the U.S. chip producers formed an R&D consor-
tium called Sematech. Sematech's mission is to advance chip technology,
and it is subsidized by the federal government. Some of the U.S. chip
producers have been lobbying for a separate U.S. government organized
and supported consortium to manufacture memory chips, accompanied
by an antitrust exemption. Others have been lobbying to replace the
1986 trade agreement with tariffs, so that the U.S. Government, rather
than the Japanese, can profit from the Japanese producers' low prices.
The memory chip market is international. There are no significant
transportation costs or duties. To make an advantageous deal, buyers
purchase chips in the country of the producer, wherever that producer is.
At present, the Japanese account for 90% of the world memory chip
market, and they account for 90% of U.S. open market purchases (this
excludes IBM's sales to itself). Also, Japanese producers account for
90% of the memory chip sales in Japan, which is the largest market for
chips in the world.
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The computer industry will probably account for 80% of all Z-
RAM uses, and the telecommunications market will account for nearly
20% The market for large (mainframe) computers is concentrated, with
shares of U.S. sales approximately as follows:
TABLE 1:









These market facts and configurations preceded the Z-RAM break-
through. The announced availability of the Z-RAM technology led to
the development of significant new plans by the chip producers. First,
Texas Instruments and Advanced Micro Devices wish to merge. They
plan to use their joint capabilities as chip manufacturers to develop appli-
cations for the chips and to market them. Second, Intel and Micron
Technologies, both chip manufacturers, wish to merge with Digital
Equipment, a leading U.S. computer manufacturer. The three compa-
nies plan to combine their capabilities, have a ready outlet for their Z-
RAM production, and experiment on applications with greatest facility
and least cost. Finally, Motorola and National Semiconductor, both
chip manufacturers, and Hewlett-Packard, a computer manufacturer,
likewise plan to merge. They will concentrate on exploiting the horizon-
tal and vertical economies of integration and scale. IBM, AT&T, and
each group of merger partners will take licenses to make the Z-RAM.
These merger plans and other initiatives, which will be described
below, have been influenced by the expectation of a steep learning curve
for production of Z-RAMs. The firms that get to the market first and
establish a large market share quickly will gain significant efficiencies and
will have most of the market for themselves. Parties in the United States,
including the Defense Department, hope it will be the U.S. chip produ-
cers, and not the Japanese, who will be able to do this. Moreover, the
United States knows that the Japanese are investing billions of dollars in
research and new facilities, and hopes that the Japanese will not surpass
the new technology before the U.S. producers arrive on the market.
The U.S. firms that expect to get licenses to make the Z-RAMs have
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just formed a Z-RAM trade association called "SHAZAM." Under the
aegis of SHAZAM, they have discussed the advantages of being out in
front first, and they have shared ideas about the value of strategic pricing
of the first generation of Z-RAMs. Instructed by the lectures of a busi-
ness strategist provided by SHAZAM, the U.S. firms have observed that
if they price below initial marginal cost, they will get larger markets at
home and abroad. As a result, they will get more experience, which will
produce significantly lower costs per Z-RAM chip. Thus, they will be
able to recoup their foregone profits within five years, and they will con-
tinue to produce more and more Z-RAMs. The U.S. producers have
agreed that each firm will set its prices independently.
Anticipating a closed Japanese market, SHAZAM also announces a
plan to use the combined strength of its members to exploit Japan's need
for U.S.-made computers and telecommunications equipment services.
By doing so, SHAZAM hopes to negotiate access to the Japanese market
for memory chips, especially Z-RAMs.
Toshiba, NEC, Hitachi, Fujitsu, Mitsubishi, and Oki sue for viola-
tions of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.
B. Stage Two
Four years have passed. The Japanese chip producers have lost
their case. Citing Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado Inc., s Matsu-
shita,19 Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.,2 and the Foreign Trade Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1982, 21 the district court ruled that the plaintiffs did
not have a protectable interest under U.S. antitrust laws. The appellate
court affirmed without opinion, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The U.S. firms have carried out their plans. The mergers have taken
place; the low-price strategies are in process. While the Japanese have
advanced their technology, they have not yet been able to duplicate or
approach the technology underlying the Z-RAM. The six Japanese pro-
ducers obtained Z-RAM licenses, but only after a year of Z-RAM pro-
duction in the United States. Meanwhile, U.S. memory chip customers
switched to Z-RAMs for all but incidental purposes. The Japanese have
been unable to make substantial inroads into the U.S. Z-RAM market.
During the first year of Z-RAM production in the United States,
Japanese buyers bought Z-RAMs from U.S. producers, but they
switched 100% of their Z-RAM business to Japanese producers as soon
18 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
19 475 U.S. 574.
20 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
21 15 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 45.
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as the Japanese began to produce the Z-RAM chip. Thereupon, the
members of SHAZAM refused to sell IBM-produced and other desired
computers, and AT&T-produced and other desired telecommunications
equipment and services, to Japanese buyers until such time as the Japa-
nese should open their market to U.S. Z-RAM sellers.
The Japanese chip producers, computer buyers, and telecommunica-
tions service users sue. The unintegrated U.S. computer companies join
the suit, alleging imminent monopolization of the chip market, and thus,
higher prices for chips.
C. Stage Three
The suit is still pending. It is mired down in discovery. The defend-
ants claim that they need numerous documents and depositions from the
Japanese, but they have thus far been frustrated not only by the language
barrier, but also by claims that the act of state, sovereign immunity, for-
eign sovereign encouragement/compulsion, and extraterritoriality doc-
trines shield production of key documents located in Japan and
depositions of key individuals situated there.
You have been summoned to a meeting of the Attorney General of
the United States, the Secretary of Commerce, the U.S. Trade Represen-
tative, and the Secretary of Defense. Rumor has it that the Japanese
have just surpassed the Z-RAM technology. The subject is the chip crisis
and what to do about it.
Imagine a transcript of the meeting. After all officials have spoken,
you are asked for your opinion of the best strategy for the United States.
What is your answer?22
IV. SUMMARY
This is the question for tomorrow. The answer is not simple, and
the answer is not simply antitrust. New forms of competition will inspire
new forms of combination. Are they, on balance, pro-competitive or
anti-competitive? Progressive or regressive? Enabling or protective?
New technologies and the possibilities for their exploitation inspire
targeted national industrial strategies by our trading partners. Japanese
industrialists, guided by MITI, successfully orchestrate such strategies.
The United States (and the Japanese) fear that the Europeans of 1992
and thereafter will do so too. How should the United States prepare to
22 The Z-RAM problem is reprinted from E. Fox and L. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON ANTITRUST (West 1989), with permission of West Publishing Company.
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meet the world of the 1990s? Counter-industrial strategies will surely
seem tempting. Being like the Japanese has seductive appeal.
The answer cannot be derived from a simple model by deductive
logic. Practical experience based on knowledge of our culture must be a
guide. Although it does not give us a roadmap, practical experience of-
fers a few suggestions. The United States should continue to rely on
brain, brawn, incentive, inspiration, the spur of competition, and the as-
piration to be better than the best. If not a Rawlsian future, 3 we can
hope for a Rahlian one.
23 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
